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Labour’s National Minimum Wage
PAR
Timothy WHITTON*
ABSTRACT
LABOUR’S NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE
Having committed itself to introducing a national minimum wage, the Labour Party is
now faced with the difficult task of setting a satisfactory rate. Responsibility for this has been
given to the Low Pay Commission which will have to decide exactly what the minimum wage
is supposed to achieve before calculating the cash equivalent. The Labour Party fought the
1997 election pledging a fairer distribution of wealth and the national minimum wage is only
one part of their overall policy designed to optimise interaction between social and economic
policy.
The minimum wage is no magic wand capable of banishing household poverty with one
wave. If Labour wants to ensure its success, they should acknowledge that past failures will
take time to repair. The minimum wage’s future potential will largely depend on their ability
to cut their coat according to their cloth.
RESUME
LE SALAIRE MINIMUM DU PARTI TRAVAILLISTE
Le parti travailliste s’est engagé à instaurer un salaire minimum interprofessionnel et doit
à présent décider du taux auquel celui-ci sera établi. La responsabilité de cette tâche délicate
sera confiée à la Commission des Bas Salaires qui devra définir les buts du salaire minimum
avant  de  déterminer  le  taux  horaire  correspondant.  La  campagne  électorale  en  1997  fut
l’occasion pour le parti travailliste de se porter garant d’une distribution plus équitable des
richesses nationales et le salaire minimum ne constitue qu’une partie de sa politique globale
dont  l’objectif  est  de  rendre  optimale  l’interaction  entre  politique  sociale  et  politique
économique.
Le salaire minimum n’est pas une baguette magique capable d’un seul coup de mettre un
terme à la pauvreté dont souffrent certaines familles. Si le parti travailliste souhaite que cette
initiative soit un succès, il devra reconnaître que les échecs du passé ne pourront être effacés
immédiatement. L’évolution potentielle du salaire minimum dépendra en effet de la manière
dont les travaillistes sauront gouverner selon leurs promesses électorales.
*  Département  d’Anglais,  Université  Blaise-Pascal,  34  avenue  Carnot,  63037  Clermont-
Ferrand.
By the time this article comes to print, the Low Pay Commission may possibly have chosen
the rate at which the national minimum wage should be pitched. Given Labour’s commitment
to the issue and their considerable majority in the House of Commons, legislation designed to
enforce the minimum wage should promptly find its way to the statute books. In the past,
attempts to provide the British workforce with an across-the-board safety net, a floor beneath
which wages should not be allowed to fall have all largely failed since one or other of the
social partners has consistently refused to cooperate leaving the minimum wage as perhaps the
most controversial political and economical labour market debate at present.
The trade unions’ reticence is a case in point for it has taken them the best part of a century
to come to terms with the fact that their influence could never extend out to embrace every
nook and cranny of British industry. Their  traditional  lack of commitment  to the national
minimum wage has inevitably lead to pockets of low paid workers becoming endemic  in
Great  Britain  which  partially  explains  why the  unions  have  recently thrown their  weight
behind Labour’s plan to introduce legislation. Both the Labour Party and the TUC know that
they will receive support from their European partners on the issue and the recent signing of
the Social Charter means that in the long run their  is no turning back on their pledges to
eradicate pittance wages.
Added to this is the fact that the flexibility of labour and wage structures which go hand in
hand with political devotion to (international) market values, have exaggerated the effects of
low wages to the extent that they are no longer an isolated phenomenon but fully integrated
into the labour market. To this end, we are constantly reminded that the unemployment rate in
Great  Britain  has been continually falling over  the past  decade.  Even if  we disregard the
various ways in which unemployment statistics can be tampered with what is more to the
point is the actual cost of this low rate of unemployment in terms of “proper” jobs.
Although political authorities seem to devote their entire attention to the impact a national
minimum wage would have on employment,  they are constantly reminded by their  social
partners of a secondary issue, namely poverty. Far from being a distraction from the main task
of getting the unemployed back to work, the idea of somehow linking the introduction of a
national minimum to the alleviation of at least some form of poverty seems at first sight to be
a very laudable pursuit. The correlation between the two is in many cases crystal clear but the
danger lies in expecting too much from a minimum wage too soon. It can eradicate pittance
wages in one fell swoop or at least reduce them to the furthermost corners of industry where,
come  what  may,  very little  can  be  done  to  stop  the  most  unscrupulous  employers  from
exploiting their workforce. On the other hand, since poverty - and above all household poverty
- is more often than not due to exclusion from the labour market, the poor could be quite
simply bypassed by any benefits stemming from the minimum wage.1
One of the most popular qualities attributed to the minimum wage - peddled, it must be
said by some of the most vociferous pressure groups - is its ability to create employment. This
“monopsonistic” claim has become popular in recent years essentially because it is assumed
that  the  labour  market  from  which  low  wage  earners  are  drawn  is  increasingly limited.
Although monopsony is a theoretical curiosity, a closer look will show that applying it to the
low wage sector of British industry is mainly a distortion of text book econometrics whatever
the philanthropic motivations may be.
There is no doubt that the national  minimum wage will  upset the wage hierarchy as it
stands  and  the  potential  “knock-on”  effects  involved  could  be  disastrous.  One  way  of
minimising these and making the national minimum more acceptable would be to state just
who it is supposed to protect. For the time being, the actual aims of the minimum wage - in
terms of job quality for example - have been somewhat swept under the carpet because of the
obsession with fixing a rate at which it should be set. Perhaps with the election now well over,
the Low Pay Commission will be able to devote more time to some of these issues. Whatever
the case, this article will attempt to deal with them in more detail.
Union opposition
The idea of introducing a national minimum wage is not new but the political authorities in
Great Britain have always preferred a selective approach to an across-the-board one. This
attitude  lead  initially  to  the  creation  of  the  Trades  Boards  in  1909  which  in  1945  were
converted into the Wages Councils.2 When in 1953 the system was at its peak, the Wages
Councils  were  fixing  minimum  hourly  rates  of  pay  for  some  3.5million  workers  in  66
different sectors of British industry. What kept the councils alive for so long was the hope that
they would gradually disappear as workers in the protected sectors became organised enough
to negotiate their own rates of pay without any outside help. The fact that there were still 26
councils - of which 24 functioned annually - when the system was abolished in 1993, is the
proof  that  try  as  they might,  the  unions  were  just  not  in  a  position  to  promote  worker
organisation sufficiently for low pay to be eradicated in the course of time.
In view of this, although the Wages Councils were cumbersome and archaic they did tally
with  the  overall  union  attitude  towards  minimum  wages  since  their  aim  was  to  provide
minimum wage fixing machinery until workers were organised enough to be able to fend for
themselves. This did happen in many cases but abolition left about 2.5million workers without
any wage protection whatsoever.
However  by dint  of  believing  that  collective  bargaining  was  the  only healthy way of
dealing with low wages, the unions almost promoted the idea that a national minimum wage
would in many ways hinder prospects of extending their influence further afield. If minimum
wages were the main reason for employees working outside the sphere of influence of an
organised union wanting to establish some sort of local organisation, their initiative would be
instantly thwarted by the introduction of a national minimum. Although it would be rather
churlish to believe that unions are constantly seeking to harness the influence of organised
workforces to the extent of preying on them, this aspect cannot be overlooked.
Linked  with  this  is  an  age-old  union  tradition  that  wage  bargaining  is  part  of  union
prerogative and pride; any outside intervention implies quite simply that unions have failed in
their task to secure decent working conditions for their ranks and this probably explains their
reluctance in admitting that the national minimum wage has become a necessity and a moral
obligation.3 In fact the Wages Council system was ideal for the unions insofar as while the
most exposed flanks of British industry were protected by legislation, they could concentrate
their efforts  on the more organised sectors. There was always the hope moreover that the
Wages Councils would indeed turn out to be only a temporary measure and would eventually
disappear along with the problem of low wages.
Support for Labour’s minimum wage
It was not in fact until  the late 1980s that  the TUC began to offer serious support for
Labour’s plan to bring in a national minimum wage. Until then, their efforts to alleviate the
plight of the low paid had been very half-hearted even though every TUC annual congress was
the  opportunity  for  the  main  unions  to  make  solemn  declarations  on  the  issue.4 This
commitment to the national minimum went hand in hand with the Labour Party’s pledge,
should it be returned to power, to seriously consider the issue. The TUC was coming round to
the idea that union influence alone was not sufficient to secure the right to a “fair” wage for all
workers:
An  effective  fair  wages  strategy  must  be  based  on  the  twin  pillars  of  collective
bargaining and legislative support. Collective bargaining by itself will inevitable fail to
reach many of  those in  poorly organised sectors  where low pay so often  prevails.5
(emphasis added)
The 1980s had indeed witnessed the gradual whittling away of union control over British
industry and the sphere of pay bargaining was no exception. To this end the 1946 Fair Wages
Clause which ensured the automatic transfer nationwide of union rates and conditions of work
negotiated locally, was repealed in 1982. This had been the unions’ idea of “fairness” in pay
bargaining  but  was  not  to  survive  the  sweeping  trade  union  reforms  introduced  by  the
Conservative government.
Meanwhile, the TUC was faced with the problem of deciding on the sort of rate at which
the national minimum should be set. Although the national minimum as an issue is not an
election  winner  or  loser,  when  translated  into  an  hourly  rate  that  will  become  a  legal
requirement,  it  can  have  serious  effects  on  voting  patterns.  Very little  reliable  statistical
information exists on this particular point but the principle of introducing a minimum wage is
far  more  acceptable  than  its  actual  adoption.  The  concept  can  seem  “fair”,  but  when  a
statutory minimum is actually suggested, the immediate effects on wage bills,  employment
and general financial strategy become the centre of the debate. This explains the apparent
dilly-dallying  of  the  TUC and especially the  Labour Party in  announcing their  respective
minimum wage targets for both of them were fully aware of the dangers involved.6
In order  to  soften the blow, the TUC linked the idea of a  national  minimum wage to
Labour’s  pledge to  tackle  poverty.  The minimum wage  per se could  be  seen as  a  major
interference  in  pay  bargaining  and  the  unions  stood  to  lose  by  offering  their  support.
Nevertheless by accepting the fact that the minimum wage had the potential of making serious
inroads into reducing poverty, the unions were making an important concession. This was a
strategic compromise for not only were they bearing the banner of justice and fairness but they
were also showing their will to strive politically with the Labour Party to achieve a common
goal, perfectly in tune with the sort of partnership that New Labour is keen to foster. Public
opinion can only cast a sympathetic eye on such an attitude devoid of traditional bullying
tactics, and adopts a far friendlier stance towards minimum wages. At the same time, “decent”
pay remains a rather vague notion and enables those who promote it to brandish it as an ideal
and not merely an hourly rate instantly to be pounced upon by political opponents eager to
calculate the harm it will inflict on the national economy.
After the 1992 defeat of Labour, the TUC suddenly became bolder on the minimum wage
issue and it  became common practice to endorse a target at  each annual conference. This
culminated  in  1996 when it  published  Arguments  for  a National  Minimum Wage,  a clear
defence for a national minimum far more ambitious than the rates that the recently abolished
Wages Councils had been negotiating annually. The TUC conference in September 1996 was
indeed fraught with clashes between the Labour Party and individual unions over demands
concerning the rate at which the minimum wage should be pitched. The Labour Party sought
to play down the issue by adopting the wise man’s approach namely that even if the national
minimum was an electoral commitment, setting the actual rate was best left until after the
election.
Mr Blair has made it clear the minimum wage will be set at a level the country can
afford. A Low pay Commission - made up of employers, unions and academics - will be
told not  to  recommend a figure that  could be seen as damaging public  finances  or
endangering jobs.7
In this way it was hoped that the TUC would continue to support the idea but would not
endorse the more outrageous rates proposed by some of the more vociferous unions such as
UNISON and the NUM. The tactics worked only partially for the TUC called for “more than
£4 but [would leave] the precise figure flexible until after the election, alongside the demand
for £4.26 in the first year of a Labour government”.8 This position was to take priority over
the rebel unions’ claims.
Possible disemployment effects
It  is  not  possible  to  set  a  perfect  rate  given the  industrial  environment  which  will  be
affected. If the “least worst” approach is adopted, the national minimum will be constantly
beleaguered with its own negative connotations. Somewhere between the two however there
is the distinct possibility of exercising a certain number of political choices that will at least
have the merit of getting the national minimum on the statute books. The minimum wage will
represent a definite attempt to set a floor to wage levels.
Defining what a decent minimum is in terms of wages is of course highly subjective and a
plethora of factors have to be taken into account: if the national minimum is set to high then it
will generate unemployment since employers might reduce output and lay off workers in order
to maintain their wage bill,  or displace investment in labour to investment in capital or in
machines. Alternatively higher wages can lead to price rises which in turn mean inflation,
lower competitiveness and the well-known consequences this  has on employment.  Even if
employees  benefiting  immediately  from  the  national  minimum  manage  to  retain  their
employment, in the long run they could be threatened by this inflationary cycle.
The  inflationary  effects  of  an  ambitious  minimum  are  even  more  apparent  when  the
‘knock-on’ effects are taken into consideration. Very briefly, not only would a high minimum
wage immediately affect in one way or another all employees whose pay is below the rate but
also those with higher wages, keen to maintain wage differentials.
The monopsonistic claim
Despite the rather obvious disemployment effects of a minimum wage set above market
clearing levels it has become fashionable recently to suggest the contrary. This is particularly
the case for the Low Pay Unit which has been campaigning for years for the introduction of a
national  minimum  wage.  Although  the  Unit  is  a  reliable  source  of  information  when
denouncing the scandalous exploitation of employees in some of the lowest paying sectors of
British industry their use of the monopsonistic claim in presenting a case for a minimum wage
leaves a lot to be desired.
Monopsony is used to describe a market in which there is only one buyer, for example of
labour.  The  textbook  example  of  monopsony  is  the  one-company  town  (e.g.  a  lumber
settlement in Oregon). A monopsonistic employer determines his wage rate according to the
number  of  workers  he  needs  to  attract  into  employment  but  will  restrict  the  level  of
employment in his establishment so as to limit the extent to which he will drive wages up
against  himself.  Employment  in  a  monopsonist  market  will  therefore  be  lower  than  in  a
competitive one.9
Should a minimum wage be introduced in a situation of monopsony, the employer will
have no incentive to restrict the amount of labour resulting in both an increase in employment
and wage  rates.  This  phenomenon  probably  accounts  for  the  enthusiasm  with  which
monopsony is used in the defence of a national minimum wage. What could be better indeed
than introducing a minimum wage that would create employment?
The confusion lies firstly in the fact that the workforce operating in the low paying sectors
is  similar  to  the  textbook  example  of  monopsony but  not  in  the  way that  many national
minimum wage advocates would have it. Skills and qualifications are largely homogenous in
both  but  whereas  wages  in  the  lumber  settlement  are  used  to  attract  workers  until  the
employer’s  industrial  needs  are  satisfied,  this  is  not  the  case  in  Britain  where the  labour
market is largely competitive and subject more and more to the conditions of the international
market. Wages are largely dictated by the workings of each single labour market operating
under the auspices of the national economy including its vices and virtues, a far cry from the
situation that prevails  in the Oregon lumber settlement where employers’ wage strategy is
largely free from the constraints imposed by the outside world.
What must be retained even so from the monopsonist argument is the homogeneity of the
workforce that would be affected by minimum wage legislation. Generally speaking skills and
training in the low paying sectors are minimal.10 Because of this and the pressure brought to
bear  by  unemployment  and  more  stringent  laws  concerning  access  to  benefits,  they  are
increasingly vulnerable to any displacement of job seekers from other even higher paying
sectors where employment prospects are grim. As a result, competition is if anything far more
fierce because of the potential workforce available, enabling employers, should they so desire,
to compress wages even further.
By creating an artificial wage floor above the market clearing level in these sectors, it is
quite obvious that employment would be affected especially for those that it is designed to
protect,  namely  employees  ill-equipped  to  defend  their  own  interests.  Quite  apart  from
destroying  normal  employment  possibilities,  a  high  minimum  wage  would  make  some
employment attractive to workers with greater skills and qualifications thus excluding those
with lower ability from integration in the labour market.
The impact of a national minimum wage on poverty
One of the most specious arguments flouted by the unions and the various pressure groups
in defence of  the minimum wage is  the  potential  impact  it  would have on poverty.  This
probably accounts for their claims which in most cases pitch the minimum well above the
market clearing levels for the lowest paying sectors and in some cases even for sectors where
low pay is not perceived as being a problem. By banishing low wages, - or establishing a high
minimum wage depending on your point of view - it is hoped that household poverty will be
reduced.  Killing  two  birds  with  one  stone is  indeed  a  comforting  perspective,  but  not  a
realistic one.
Information  is  readily  available  for  researchers  interested  in  calculating  the  effect  of
minimum wages on household poverty.11 In its 1996 pamphlet, the TUC uses official statistics
to show how different minimum wages would affect the various household income deciles.12
One of the conclusions drawn underlines however, the sheer speculation that lies behind their
research:
The evidence presented here suggests a strong link between low pay and household
poverty. One should note that these results may overstate the poverty reducing effects
of a minimum wage since we have not included households with no workers, who
would clearly not be affected by a minimum wage. It is also true that we have ignored
any offsetting tax or benefit effects on household income that may arise with higher
levels  of  pay.  However,  it  is  clear  that  the  introduction  of  a  minimum  wage at
something like these rates would provide most benefit to workers from the poorest
working households.13(emphasis added)
Apart from the vagueness surrounding some of these sweeping statements, the basic error
made here is to confuse pay and income. Although they are closely linked they are still two
completely different aspects of any economy. Households suffering from pay induced by low
wages  would  be  affected  by the  introduction  of  a  national  minimum  if  the  wage earner
managed to retain his employment and if the minimum were set above the original wage. But,
should the wage earner be excluded from the labour market  because his employer can no
longer afford to employ him it is likely that his family will suffer even greater poverty.
A wage which gives access to benefits  such as Family Credit  or Housing Benefit,  free
school meals etc., could be more valuable in terms of income than a national minimum which
increases earnings but reduces overall  disposable income due to higher income tax and/or
exclusion  from  benefits.14 This  is  particularly  true  for  household  resources  which  are
particularly sensitive to the interaction between tax, benefits and wages.
This rather speculative debate overlooks even so the simple fact that household poverty
stems mainly from lack of employment than from low wages. Once again, ample research has
been undertaken on the subject and generally the conclusions drawn coincide.15 A recent study
sums up these findings thus: Many of the two largest demographic groups benefiting from a
NMW  [National  Minimum  Wage] -  younger  workers  and  females  in  a  couple  -  are  in
households  with  more  than  one  earner,  so  a  NMW  leaves  the  bulk  of  family  poverty
untouched.16 This last remark is expounded upon in the following way:
The majority of low income families have no-one in work so a NMW would be of little
direct benefit  to them. For low income families with someone in work, low pay and
many children [sic] contribute roughly equally to the low family income. Unfortunately,
as things stand, a NMW would also do little to combat family poverty among those
families. Higher income tax and national insurance, coupled with reductions in family
credit and housing benefit, mean that net gains in income would be only a very small
fraction of each extra £1 earned via the introduction of a NMW.17
In view of this there can be little doubt that the minimum wage is too blunt an instrument
to be useful for reducing poverty. Because of this confusion, many minimum wage advocates
are barking up the wrong tree which in the long run can only delay implementation.
One way of pitching the national minimum at a workable level would be to define what it
is supposed to achieve and who it is supposed to protect. In this way the minimum would be
part of a different approach to a “fairer”, more “decent” or even more “just” distribution of
income.
Labour’s alternative
The Labour Party fought  the 1992 election promising a minimum wage of £3.40/hour.
Their defeat put paid to the introduction of the minimum wage as their political opponents
continued dogmatically to deregulate the market. In terms of pure ideology pay bargaining
was supposed to reflect the flexibility of the labour market and involve primarily individual
relationships between employers and their employees. Pay was to be negotiated according to
merit which went against the grain of the more traditional practice of collective bargaining.
Whether this was an attempt in the long run to reduce union influence even further remains to
be proven but there is little doubt that the British labour market has been substantially freed
from outside intervention..
One way of analysing both labour market deregulation and the overall state of employment
- or unemployment - in the low paying sectors of British industry, is to look at the situation in
the  former  Wages  Council  industries.  Any improvement  in  employment  in  these  sectors
would be a legitimate step in the right direction if job creation took priority over minimum
wage standards. The Low Pay Unit has examined available information and found that not
only have wages fallen since abolition but that employment has increased. This second point
corresponds exactly to what the free market advocates had predicted.
What overall  figures for unemployment do not  show however is  that  there has been a
massive increase in part-time employment to the detriment of full-time jobs:
Full-time
000s
Part-time
000s
Part-time
000s
March 1992-September 1993
(full-time equivalents)
-13.1 +78.2
+31.3
+65.0
+18.2
September 1993-March 1995
(full-time equivalents)
-65.7 +65.9
+26.4
+0.1
-39.3
Source: Low Pay Network, Priced into Poverty: An Analysis of Pay rates in former Wages
Council Industries, London: Low Pay Unit, 1995, p.16.
Although these figures do not take seasonal adjustment into account they do show quite
clearly that employment was more buoyant prior to abolition and that abolition has lead to
many full-time jobs being transformed into part-time ones.
That employment prospects in these sectors were more promising before abolition must not
be taken as implying that minimum wages create employment to the extent described by some
pressure groups. The positive influence they do have on employment is legitimate in the sense
that employers benefit  from some form of wage stability which in turn can prevent wage
undercutting and encourage employers to reduce workforce turnover - incidentally another
prominent feature in the low paying sectors - by promoting loyalty especially for workers with
specific skills acquired within the firm. In general the outlook can be more healthy for both
parties. The typical former Wages Council sector employer who in many cases doubles up as
accountant  and  foreman  has  little  time  to  devote  to  individual  pay bargaining  and  often
welcomes the possibility of being able to dispense with tedious negotiating.18
As  far  as  the  second  conclusion  is  concerned  labour  market  flexibility  has  led  to  a
considerable increase in part-time work enabling politicians to present a far more positive
assessment of unemployment statistics. The policy of jobs at any price (low pay is better than
no pay) appears to have fulfilled its promises.
Here  is  where  New Labour  can  intervene  by making  sure,  in  its  overall  approach  of
combining social and economic policy rather than treating the two as completely separate
entities, that work pays.19 Old Labour has a long standing debt towards the low paid and its
history of missed opportunities means that New Labour’s commitment to focus on a fairer
distribution  of  earnings  can  quite  easily include  the  introduction  of  a  national  minimum
wage.20 It is high time indeed that responsibility for wage protection is acknowledged as being
a  problem for  Parliament  and  no  longer  as  any sort  of  political  encroachment  on  union
prerogatives.
This is not a defence of selective minimum wage fixing machinery such as the Wages
Councils  but  of one single rate below which no fully-fledged worker whatever his  or her
particular  circumstances  is  allowed to  fall.  Although some degree  of  tolerance should  be
included  to  cover  young  workers,  training  possibilities  and  certain  categories  of  workers
whose disabilities exclude them from the mainstream labour market, an across the board rate,
if not ideal, is at least easy to monitor and enforce.
When  it  comes  to  the  crunch  of  deciding  on  a  minimum  wage,  Labour’s  Low  Pay
Commission will take all the aforementioned points into account. If it tries to catch up on lost
time by imitating its European neighbours, the shockwaves that this will send through the
whole of the pay spectrum will be considerable. If on the other hand it works backwards by
deciding  how many people  should  be  covered  (in  most  other  European countries  with  a
minimum wage the figure stands at about 10% of the workforce) and the sort of wage gap that
would be tolerable in order to limit knock-on effects, the rate could then be set accordingly. It
goes without saying that the whole process should fully integrate union cooperation in order
for strict priority to be given to the minimum wage during further wage negotiations. If this
element  is  overlooked and not  dealt  with statutorily,  there is  the chance that  differentials
obtained by stronger unions would in time compress the minimum wage below an acceptable
decency threshold. This would also be the case in relative terms if the statutory minimum
were used as a basis for all pay bargaining.
One way of ensuring initial success lies in pitching the minimum at a low rate so as to
minimise its impact on employment yet maximise its future potential. Rates above £4/hour
commonly proposed by pressure groups possibly encouraged by European decency threshold
targets are far too high and the Labour Party knows this.  If, as many employers suggest,
“going rates” tended to be in excess of Wages Council fixed minima, then why not chose the
average former Council rate adjusted to what the 1996 level would be?
The figure stands at £3.20/hour, perhaps a low benchmark compared with other claims but
it is endowed with the essential qualities that would contribute to ensuring the initial success
of the national  minimum wage. It can accommodate regional variations  and its  effects on
legitimate employment would probably be negligible. In this respect even the Confederation
of British Industry which has always been opposed to a minimum wage stated recently that “it
could live with a minimum wage of £3.50”.21 Also, protection would be approximately similar
to what other countries provide which at a time when European harmonisation is being given
top priority, cannot be neglected.
*
The European Social Charter states that citizens have a right to a fair rate of pay. Whether
the overall  aim of  promoting minimum wages is  to  reduce wage undercutting within  the
boundaries of Europe in order to stabilise competition, or quite simply provide a decent rate of
pay on principle, is another debate. Labour has stated quite clearly that it has no intention of
systematically  undoing  what  its  political  opponents  took  18  years  to  achieve  but  will
endeavour to implement a new drive towards more fairness in the distribution of wealth. The
market principles to which the Conservatives were so devoted have introduced unacceptable
distortions into the way earnings are distributed and the national minimum is just one way in
which some of these can be abolished.22
At whatever rate it is pitched, the minimum rate will affect the labour market and will have
disemployment effects. Yet this seems a fair price to pay if Britain wants to get rid of the sort
of employment that is at the root of pittance wages. If it takes responsibility for this, then New
Labour will  have respected its  commitment  to  labour  market  flexibility but  only up  to  a
certain point: beyond this, it is not a case of job creation or poverty but principle, something
that the unfettered market cannot quite embrace.
1NOTES
 By household - or family poverty - I mean insufficient income relative to a family’s needs. It goes without saying that
family size must be taken into account when attempting to calculate needs.
2 For a full description of the Trades Boards and the Wages Councils see my two articles: “Wages Councils: bilan”,
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